"Blockers: A Reply to Hawthorne"
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, No. 2 (Vol. 44), 2015
Abstract: Physicalism is roughly the thesis that everything is physical. The two most popular ways of formulating physicalism rigorously are the ways given by Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. The best objections, in turn, include John Hawthorne’s ‘blocker’ objections. Hawthorne argues that, if it is possible for there to be non-physical beings or properties that prevent certain mental phenomena from existing (i.e., non-physical blockers), Jackson’s and Chalmers’ formulations will be inadequate. Jackson’s formulation will be inadequate by virtue of not capturing all of the right physical dependence principles. Chalmers’ formulation will be inadequate in so far as, when modified to define ‘restricted physicalisms’—such as physicalism of the mental—the restricted formulations will not capture all of the right physical dependence principles. By contrast, I object to Hawthorne’s blocker arguments in three ways. First, I argue that non-physical blockers are impossible, in which case Hawthorne’s blocker arguments are misguided—worrying about something that isn’t possible anyway. Second, I argue that his critique of Chalmers’ formulation is unsound, as it falsely presupposes that restricted physicalisms require restricted formulations of physicalism. Third, I argue that Jackson’s and Chalmers’ formulations do capture all of the right physical dependence principles.
Abstract: Physicalism is roughly the thesis that everything is physical. The two most popular ways of formulating physicalism rigorously are the ways given by Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. The best objections, in turn, include John Hawthorne’s ‘blocker’ objections. Hawthorne argues that, if it is possible for there to be non-physical beings or properties that prevent certain mental phenomena from existing (i.e., non-physical blockers), Jackson’s and Chalmers’ formulations will be inadequate. Jackson’s formulation will be inadequate by virtue of not capturing all of the right physical dependence principles. Chalmers’ formulation will be inadequate in so far as, when modified to define ‘restricted physicalisms’—such as physicalism of the mental—the restricted formulations will not capture all of the right physical dependence principles. By contrast, I object to Hawthorne’s blocker arguments in three ways. First, I argue that non-physical blockers are impossible, in which case Hawthorne’s blocker arguments are misguided—worrying about something that isn’t possible anyway. Second, I argue that his critique of Chalmers’ formulation is unsound, as it falsely presupposes that restricted physicalisms require restricted formulations of physicalism. Third, I argue that Jackson’s and Chalmers’ formulations do capture all of the right physical dependence principles.